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Drawing on data from the twenty year long German Socioeconomic Panel Study, we show 
that partisanship is bounded.  Almost every West German, East German, and immigrant never 
supports one or both of the major parties and most people vary support for their party by 
claiming no partisan preference.  Hardly anyone ever selects each of the parties at different 
points in time.  Immediate social networks join with social class and religious factors to 
structure partisanship.  The same social logic underpins partisan choice among West 
Germans, East Germans, and immigrants, though factors unique to each population are also 
present.   
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Applied to politics, partisanship refers to a preference for a political party.  Partisans tell 
themselves –as they reflect on politics –and others –in surveys and personal conversations – 
that they support a party.  Acting on this self-understanding, they usually vote for the party’s 
candidates; they also usually take policy views in line with those of their party, and when they 
work in campaigns they assist that party.  Partisanship lies at the heart of political behavior in 
established democracies. 
Drawing on data obtained from the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP), 
researchers show that partisanship is bounded.  Over time, most citizens never support one or 
both of the major parties and vary support for their party by also claiming no partisan 
preference.  Hardly anyone ever selects each of the major parties at different points in time 
(Kohler 2002; Schmitt-Beck, Wieck, and Christoph 2002; and Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, and 
Dasović 2003; 2004; 2005; Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, Dasović, and Brynin 2002, who also find 
the same patterns in Britain).  Relatively few Germans are stable partisan identifiers –in the 
classic image of the Michigan School’s concept of party identification (see for example 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller 
and Shanks 1996).  Hardly any behave as if they are consumers of the parties’ wares –who 
move from one party to the other as prices and evaluations of the merchandise vary, as 
rational choice theorists would have it (see for example Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981; 2002, and 
Kiewiet 1983; Shively 1977).  
What accounts for these patterns?  The evidence reaffirms that partisan choice reflects 
the analytical ties among religion, social class, and party that have characterized European 
politics for decades and that persist, even as indications of “individualized politics” appear.
1   
                                                 
1 Representative recent examples of this voluminous literature include the essays in Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000; Evans 1999a; Franklin, Mackie, Valen et al. 1992 as well as Clarke, Stewart, and 
  1More fundamentally, however, it underlines the importance of immediate social and political 
networks as contexts for partisanship.  Individuals choose political parties, by taking into 
account the perceptions, values, actions, and cues of other persons.  The stronger and the more 
frequent the social tie, the more powerful is the influence
2  Along with a person’s political 
interest, these interactions provide the social mechanisms that structure partisanship in Britain 
and Germany.   
Here, we expand the analysis of micro-partisanship by using SOEP’s data to compare 
three different populations: West Germans, East Germans, and immigrants.  Of the total 
population of the Federal Republic of Germany, approximately 76 percent are West Germans, 
19 percent live in the area of the former Communist Regime (the German Democratic 
Republic-GDR), and 5 percent are immigrants (Conradt 2001: 43-4; Lahav 2004: 262, and see 
the Appendix for a full elaboration).  With regard to partisanship, the three groups differ in 
important ways.  West Germans are veteran citizens of an established democracy.  They are 
attuned to the country’s multi-party competition that is dominated by the Christian 
Democratic/Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).  Indeed, after 
decades of democratic rule, the partisanship of West Germans looks much like those of other 
long-standing democracies (see Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, and Dasović 2003, 2004; 2005; 
Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, Dasović and Brynin 2002 for the comparison with Britain).  Residents 
of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) are also members of the German nation, 
but they are new citizens of the Federal Republic; they have little experience with its political 
                                                                                                                                                          
Whitely 1997; Dalton 2000; Gluchowski and von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1998; Norpoth 1984; 
Richardson 1991; Schmitt 1998; Schmitt and Holberg 1995, and Sinnott 1998.  As we find strong class 
and religious effects on partisanship in both countries, we lend support to Evans 1999b, 1999c; 
Goldthorpe 1999a, 1999b; Kotler-Berkowitz 2001; Müller 1999; Weakliem and Heath 1999.  Applied 
to Germany, see for example Dalton and Bürklin 2003; Falter, Schoen, and Caballero 200; Kohler 
2002; Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, and Dasović 2003; 2004; 2005; Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, Dasović, and 
Brynin 2002.   
2 Classic sources of this approach are Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, 
and Gaudet (1968); Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995.  Zuckerman 2005a offers an intellectual history of 
the approach and the essays in Zuckerman 2005b exemplify recent research.  See Baker 1974 for an 
early analysis of West German partisanship that emphasizes the importance of its transmission within 
the family. 
  2parties and no history of democratic rule.  Immigrants are not Germans; those born in member 
countries of the European Union may vote in local and European, but not German national 
elections; they have no direct role in German national politics (see the Appendix for more 
details).  Still, all three have lived through the collapse of the East German regime and the Re-
Unification of the German state.  They also have experienced the shift in government power 
from Kohl and the CDU/CSU government to Schroeder and the SPD.  SOEP allows us to 
compare the partisanship of three different sets of persons living together under the same 
government. 
As expected, the evidence shows that new citizens and non-citizens display lower 
levels of aggregate partisanship than do veteran citizens.  Also in line with the classic 
literature, age related variables distinguish partisan support among West Germans, but they 
have no impact on the probability of supporting a party among East Germans and 
immigrants.
3  No matter the different levels of partisanship in the three populations and the 
variable impact of age, very similar processes appear: just about everyone distinguishes a 
major party that they support with a variable level of certainty and a major party that they 
never support; few ever choose each of the major parties over time.  At the same time and of 
theoretical importance, the immediate social and political circumstances of their lives help to 
account for their partisan choices among East Germans and immigrants as well as West 
Germans.  Partisanship reflects a social logic. 
German Socioeconomic Panel Study as a Source for the Analysis of Party Support 
                                                 
3 Converse 1969, 1976 provides the classic statement relating age to the development of partisanship.  
Niemi, Stanley, and Evans 1984, Niemi, Powell, Stanley, and Evans 1985, and Niemi and Barkan 
1987 modify the argument to cases with new electorates, and for the application to the new democracy 
of Spain, see Barnes, McDonough, and Lopez Pina 1985.  With the collapse of the Communist 
polities, the issue has re-emerged; see Brader and Tucker 2001 for a review of developments in Russia 
and for an effort to reframe the conceptualization of partisanship in new democracies.  Cain, Kiewiet, 
and Uhlaner 1991 and Cho 1999 link length of residence and partisanship among various immigrant 
groups in the United States.  For an early comparison of West and East Germans, see the essays in 
Dalton 1996, especially Dalton and Bürklin 1996.  Brady 2003 reviews the politics of immigrant 
incorporation in Germany.   
  3SOEP
4 interviews a large and representative sample of the population of the German 
Federal Republic, while over-sampling East Germans, and immigrants each year.  Beginning 
in 1984 with the West Germans and immigrants and adding the East German sample in the  
months just before Re-Unification, it continues into the foreseeable future.  No other panel 
survey encompasses so many years, and all others contain much smaller samples.
5  Unlike 
almost all other studies of social and political networks, SOEP is a national –not local –study; 
it interviews everyone present over the age of fifteen, without relying on the reports of one 
member, and it follows persons who move into new households and then asks the battery of 
questions of all adults present there as well.
6  The survey offers an extensive and detailed 
array of data for the exploration of micro-partisanship, as well as many other elements of 
German social, economic, and political life.  
Consider how it permits the measurement of partisan support.  The English language 
translation of the relevant question reads: “Many people in the Federal Republic of Germany 
[Germany, after 1990] are inclined to a certain political party, although from time to time they 
vote for another political party.  What about you: Are you inclined--generally speaking--to a 
particular party?”  Those who respond, “yes” – we define as party supporters.  They are then 
asked, “Which one?” and handed a card that lists all parties with seats in the Bundestag.
7  This 
defines party preference.  The protocol repeats the set of questions in each and every one of 
SOEP’s waves.  Because the opening question names no parties, it avoids problems of 
                                                 
4 Full descriptions of the survey may be obtained from the web site of the Deutsche Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin).  We want to thank DIW and SOEP, and to note that they bear no 
responsibility for our analysis.  
5 Closest in design and value is the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), which begins in 1991 and 
is also ongoing.  See Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, and Dasović 2003; 2005; Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, 
Dasović, and Brynin 2002. 
6 The survey follows respondents who move, but is less able to maintain contact with those who are in 
temporary housing, and people who move frequently (Kroh and Spiess 2004).  As a result, even SOEP 
probably understates the level of instability in the responses to questions on partisanship. 
7 This question closely resembles the one used in the German national election and other political 
surveys, and the marginal results match these data as well (see Falter, Schoen, and Caballero 2000; 
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002:164-203; Schickler and Green 1997:463; Norpoth 1984; Zelle 
1998:70).    
  4instrumentation that are associated with the traditional measure.
8  It offers no answers to those 
who would not otherwise be able to do so.  Because it also asks the respondents to describe 
themselves, it does not prejudge the issue of psychological attachment.  After all, one may 
claim to support a party without identifying with that political entity.  Because SOEP 
regularly taps party choices during and between electoral periods, political campaigns do not 
much influence the responses.  Indeed, the evidence shows that persons are more likely to 
support a party in an election year than during off years.  These questions offer reliable and 
internally valid measures of partisan support in Germany. 
We address two related dependent variables: whether or not the respondent supports a 
party and which one is named.  The parties vary across the three samples.  Almost all West 
Germans who name a party select the CDU/CSU or the SPD, and so our analysis of this 
sample focuses only on these two parties, omitting the Free Democrats (FDP), the Greens, and 
others.  East Germans add the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the reincarnated and 
transformed ruling party of the East German state, and so we add this choice to this analysis.  
Immigrants, however, name only the SPD.  These are the relevant parties for each of the 
samples. 
The survey offers unparalleled opportunities to study the social logic of partisanship.  By 
questioning each person in the household who is at least sixteen years of age, the data enable 
us to focus on the immediate and most intimate social ties: the social unit characterized by 
relatively high levels of trust and dependence, shared information and values, and the unit in 
                                                 
8 Most versions of the traditional measure contain wording like the following: “Generally speaking do 
you think of yourself as an X, Y, or Z?” where the letters indicated the names of particular political 
parties.  This question implies identification and contributes a specific answer to the question, thereby 
prompting a response.  Presented again and again in a Panel Study, it increases both the probability of 
an answer in each year and the same answer over time.  Its use may offer another reason for the high 
levels of partisan stability found in Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002).  See Zuckerman, 
Fitzgerald, and Dasović 2003; 2004; 2005 and Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, Dasović and Brynin 2002 for a 
full review of this issue and the related literature.  Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002 insist on the 
value of the traditional measure, maintaining that only this question taps partisan identification.  
Because this paper is not the appropriate venue for a full discussion, we focus here on the more 
general concept partisanship, as defined above, without presuming that it entails a psychological 
attachment. 
  5which political discussion –both direct and verbal and indirect and non-verbal –is most likely 
to occur.  Similarly, it provides information on the distribution of partisanship in the German 
state in which each respondent resides.  In addition, questions about voluntary work, social 
contacts, and trade union and other social memberships tap social ties beyond the household.  
There are several indicators of social class and a direct question about religious self-
identification.  Furthermore, there are assessments of several individual level political 
variables.  Finally and of critical importance several questions offer particular information 
necessary for the analyses of partisanship among East Germans and immigrants.  These data 
allow us to describe and model partisanship in the three populations. 
Micro-Partisanship in Germany 
Aggregate patterns 
Figure 1 details the aggregate levels of party support for each year of SOEP, 1985-2002 
for West Germans and immigrants, and 1992-2002 for East Germans.  As expected, West 
Germans consistently display the highest levels.  When East Germans enter the survey, their 
levels of aggregate partisanship are closer to that of the immigrants than to their fellow 
Germans.  Over time, there are small differences in the distance among the three groups.  East 
Germans and immigrants are less likely to support a political party than experienced voters, as 
the literature on the development of partisanship has long noted (see footnote 3).  No matter 
the efforts by the political parties to gather the votes of East Germans and no matter their 
status as citizens with the right to vote, their aggregate level of partisan support hardly 
changes over the decade.   
The figure also highlights growth and decline in the aggregate level of partisanship, 
another pattern in line with numerous observations of recent German politics (see for example 
Dalton and Bürklin 2003).  For the first six years, the trend lines follow the expectations of 
the classic literature on partisanship (Converse 1969; 1976).  The veteran citizens –the West 
Germans –display a relatively stable level of partisan support.  Immigrants, in turn, show a 
  6rising rate of acquisition of partisanship, also in line with the expectation of gradual increase 
with exposure to electoral competition.  Re-Unification ends this familiar trend.  First, it is 
followed by a drop in the aggregate level of partisanship among West Germans and 
immigrants, and as East Germans enter the sample, they are characterized by the same trend 
line.  For all three populations, the 1994 election stops the slide, but for the West Germans 
and the immigrants it is also not followed by returns to previous high levels.  Indeed, elections 
spike the level of partisanship for citizens, but not immigrants (see also Zelle 1998).  Even as 
the transformation of the German state is followed by declines in the aggregate level of 
partisanship, the ebb and flow of national elections is associated with rises and drops in party 
support among citizens.  During the data’s nearly two decades, however, aggregate 
partisanship declines.
9 
Place Figure 1 Here 
The panels of Figure 2 display levels of preference for the major political parties.  Figure 
2a details the relative standing of the CDU/CSU and the SPD among West Germans; Figure 
2b focuses on the SPD among immigrants (as hardly any ever support another party), and 
Figure 2c displays the relative strength of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and the PDS among East 
Germans.  Among West Germans and immigrants, German Re-Unification seems not to 
influence the relative perceptions of the parties.  The trend lines suggest that few people 
reward Kohl’s party for unifying East and West Germany.  Similarly, few people appear to 
punish the CDU/CSU for the new taxes that were levied to pay for the transformation.  Of 
note is the gradual and substantial increase of support for the PDS among East Germans.  
These results hint at the great distance between national events and the evaluation of the 
political parties.  Changes –in the form of once in a life-time events or recurrent national 
elections –seem not much to affect the relative standing of the political parties. 
                                                 
9 As the SOEP data begin in 1985, they do not enable us to address directly the observation that 
partisanship has steadily declined since the early 1970s (Schmitt and Holberg 1995; Wattenberg and 
Dalton 2000, especially Table 2.1, p. 25).  Our year-to-year evidence indicates short-term variations 
within a generalized decline in the aggregate level of partisanship. 
  7Place Figure 2a Here 
Place Figure 2b Here 
Place Figure 2c Here 
Individual Partisan Choices 
We consider the dynamics of micro-partisanship by noting first how frequently people 
name the major parties, during the years for which SOEP provides data for all three 
populations, 1992-2002.  Table 1 examines the responses of persons in the three sub-
populations who were interviewed in all eleven waves.  The first panel shows that large 
portions of the three samples –no matter their citizenship rights and personal political histories 
–never select one or the other or both of the major parties.  It also shows that the three sub-
populations are not bifurcated into those who always oppose one of the parties and always 
support the other; rather partisan support is a variable.
10  Even among the West Germans –the 
group for which there is reason to expect the most stable responses –relatively few persons 
consistently name the same party.  Table 1b shows that less than half ever name one of the 
major parties in any of the three samples; here the highest level is 46 percent of the West 
Germans who select the SPD at least once (1338/2939).  Finally, Table 1c underlines the 
extent to which persons do not move from one major party to the other.  Among West 
Germans, almost all of movement takes persons between the CDU/CSU and no party (and the 
Free Democrats, not shown in the table) or the SPD and no party (and the Greens, not shown 
in the table).  Because East Germans name the PDS with increasing frequency, they move 
between each of the three parties and no preference; like the West Germans, hardly any travel 
from party to party.  For the immigrants, all flows take persons back and forth between the 
Socialists and no announced party preference.  Partisans preference is a variable not a 
constant, and it is almost always bifurcated between naming and denying the same party. 
                                                 
10 The relative dearth of recurrent selections further highlights the internal validity of the data on party 
support.  Repeated questions do not seem to produce repeated answers; there is no evidence here of 
instrument effects in which the survey questions prompt the respondents’ answers. 
  8Place Table 1a Here 
Place Table 1b Here 
Place Table 1c Here 
Table 1d offers a summary description of the aggregate patterns.  The first row highlights 
the higher level of partisanship among West Germans than among East Germans and 
immigrants.  Note also that, during these ten years, Germany’s new citizens and its resident 
aliens most of whom are not citizens display the same rates of generalized partisanship.  The 
next two rows detail the relative levels of preference for each of the major parties in each 
sample.  The final row displays that among all three populations hardly anyone ever selects 
both of the major parties during the ten years.  Put differently, more than ninety percent never 
incline towards at least one of the major parties. 
Place Table 1d Here 
Because most persons never select one or both of the major parties and because partisans 
almost never cross to the other side of the national political divide, correlations in partisan 
choice between points in time for each person are very high.  Table 2 displays the tetrachoric 
correlation for persons in each of the three populations, across the different points in time.  
These parameters are correlations of latent continuous variables, which underpin the discrete 
observations of party support.  Pearson correlations would mis-specify the association 
between these latent traits, because they treat discrete observations as continuous ones and 
they are sensitive to the different levels of measurement (see also Green, Schickler, and 
Palmquist 2002).  These results, however, are best interpreted as additional evidence of the 
bounded nature of partisanship, not as demonstrations of constant partisanship.  As we will 
demonstrate, the choice of party responds to particular social and political determinants; it is 
not an independent attachment. 
Place Table 2 Here 
  9The analysis supports several generalizations about partisan choice over time.  Most 
everyone never supports one or both of the major political parties.  Note the complement to 
this generalization: hardly anyone ever supports both of the major parties.  Never supporting 
one party also does not imply always supporting another party.  West Germans display much 
higher rates of partisan support than do East Germans and immigrants.  Most West Germans 
name one of the major parties at least once and then vary their selections of that party with no 
announced preference, not the other major party.  East Germans add the PDS to the names of 
parties that might be supported, as they also display a bifurcated choice set, and immigrants 
only move between the SPD and no party.  20-25 percent of West Germans who ever support 
a party, do so all the time, and if we include those who pick the same party all but one time, 
the fraction rises another 10 percent.  Put differently, no more than 40 percent of the veteran 
citizens may be defined as constant supporters.  As expected, even fewer East Germans and 
immigrants display behavior that conforms to a psychological identification with a political 
party, the kind of attachments suggested by the Michigan school’s conceptualization.  Most 
persons –citizens or not, West or East Germans or not –move among a bifurcated choice set of 
selections over time, without ever crossing over to the other party.  Indeed, most individuals 
perceive two possible choices: Party A and no party or Party B and no party.   
A Multivariate Exploration of the Social Logic of Party Support 
These patterns raise two primary questions: Why do some people support any party 
and why do they choose a particular party?  Both of these assume binary dependent variables 
(whether or not a party is supported and the particular party that is named).  We answer these 
questions by applying a Probit Heckman Selection model.  This model has several strengths: 
it answers both questions at the same time and it offers a summary statistic which describes 
the strength of association between the answer to the first and second questions.  Each 
analysis draws from all of the respondents’ answers, presenting the results for an “average 
  10year.”
11  The Rho statistic is the correlation between the error terms of equation (a) and (b).  A 
significant coefficient indicates a relationship between the process to pick a party and the 
process to name a specific one.  As a result, each table contains two sets of models: an 
analysis of the decision to support a party and analyses of the choice of party.  Because we 
expect generalized partisanship to condition specific partisanship, using a simple probit model 
to account for the party named would bias the estimates.  Estimating decisions 
simultaneously, while controlling for their correlation (the rho statistic), avoids bias in the 
analysis of the party choice equation.  Given our interest in exploring the similarities and 
differences among veteran and new citizens and immigrants, we construct different models 
for each of the three sub-populations, always examining the absence or presence of partisan 
support and then modeling the choice of each party relevant to each population.  All our 
analyses use the statistical program Stata 8. 
We begin with the West German sample.  First, we list hypotheses taken from the 
approaches to the study of partisanship in established democracies.  We use a measure of age, 
in order to incorporate the expectation that party support in these polities responds to 
exposure to democratic politics.  We also include age
2 in order to capture a curvilinear 
relationship between age and the measures of support.  Two different but related hypotheses 
sustain this relationship.  Life cycle effects expect both the youngest and the oldest cohorts to 
not display the lowest levels of political participation, and by extension party support. Also in 
Germany, generational effects would expect the oldest persons to retain traces of their 
socialization under the Nazis and display relatively lower levels of partisanship (see for 
example Norpoth 1984).  Two variables capture different effects related to generalized 
notions of time.  One measures the distance from SOEP’s first year, so as to capture the 
declining levels of aggregate partisanship that we (and others) have observed.  The other 
                                                 
11 The Heckman model is an ordinary cross-sectional model, i.e. it does not correct for the difference 
of within and between individual variances.  We do, however, correct the standard errors by means of 
the Huber-White estimator of variance. 
  11details the number of days from the closest election, because of the expectation that the 
decision to support a party rises as an election nears (see the Appendix for details on this and 
all the measures).  We also include variables that assess the effects of various measures of 
socioeconomic status (income and income
2 –both controlling for the number of persons in the 
household –membership in a union (a surrogate for working class membership), and 
education, and social capital (union membership; social contacts, and membership in 
voluntary organizations).  Finally, we include a measure of the respondent’s general level of 
interest in politics as a predictor of the decision to support a party. 
Another set of variables allows us to tap our interest in the immediate social contexts 
of persons’ lives.
12  One measures the level of aggregate partisanship in the respondent’s 
region (Federal state).  Another factor–of primary theoretical importance –depicts the level f 
partisanship among other members in the respondent’s household.  Here, the analysis takes 
cognizance of a potential problem of endogeneity –mutual influence within a household.  
Following the lead offered by studies of “peer effects,” we use distinctions based on time and 
instrumental variables to address this problem (see for example Manski 1993; Sacerdote 
2000).  We lag by one year the predictor variables that detail whether or not there is a balance 
of persons in the household who are party supporters (and see the Appendix for the details of 
these measures).  As a result, the dependent variable cannot influence the predictor variable.  
Households provide the most  intimate of political contexts. 
The second set of analyses focus on the choice of party.  Here, we draw on classic 
theories of party preference as well as variables that tap our interest in the effect of household 
partisanship on the party selected.  Following the debates in the literature on the social bases 
of German partisanship, we apply again the measures of social class and religion; these 
describe a person’s generalized position in the social and economic structure.  Here, the 
                                                 
12 See Baker 1974 for an early demonstration of the power of families on the development of 
partisanship among West Germans. 
  12partisanship of the region measures the percentage that supports a particular party and 
household partisanship describes whether or not a majority support one or another of the 
major parties.   Note that Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, and Dasović (2005) show that similarities 
within British and German household do not result from assortative mating –the tendency for 
like-minded persons –with regard partisan preferences.  Note as well that membership in a 
union is not solely a measure of social class; it also highlights the probability that a person 
will encounter other persons of the same social class and –by implication –partisan 
preference.  Various worries about the economy may be associated with partisan choices.
13   
These provide a set of variables for the analysis of partisan choice. 
The models applied to the East Germans and the immigrants use the same variables.  
Here, we expect the age related variables not to affect generalized partisanship, because of the 
lack of variation in exposure to democratic politics by age.  We also do not expect social 
contacts to influence partisanship, because interactions among East Germans and interactions 
among immigrants bring together persons with low levels of partisanship.  These social ties 
reinforce the decision not to support a party.  The analyses also include measures that are 
uniquely useful to the analysis of partisanship in these two groups.  SOEP offers questions 
that speak directly to East Germans.  In 1990 and 1991, the survey asks whether or not the 
respondents were members of the GDR administration; their views of democracy and of 
social security in the GDR, and their attitudes towards the transformation of the GDR, namely 
their worries about the new living conditions after Re-Unification.  We also use questions 
designed for the immigrant population: number of years in Germany, language use (German 
relative to native tongue), whether or not they are citizens, and their country of origin. 
We begin our discussion of the results by noting that only measures of social and political 
networks influence party support and party choice in all three samples, the veteran citizens 
                                                 
13 But note as well the potentially endogenous relationship between assessments of the economy and 
partisanship; see for example Erickson 2004. 
  13(West Germans), the new citizens (East Germans), and the residents most of whom are not 
citizens (immigrants).  Looking across all three tables indicates that the most immediate 
political context of persons’ lives –the political preferences of others in their households –
displays a strong and consistent effect.  Put simply, the presence of others in the household 
who name a party always increases the probability of party support and persons who live with 
others most of whom support a particular political party have a very strong probability of also 
preferring that party.  Conversely, where most of the others in the household do not support a 
party, the respondent is not likely to do so either.  Household partisanship has both a positive 
and negative impact on party preference.  
Similarly, party support and preference respond to the distribution of these factors in the 
respondent’s region of residence, if not as strongly as it does to the household’s politics.  Note 
as well that union membership –a measure of social ties and social class –also influences 
partisanship in every model.  Only these variables consistently and strongly influence the two 
parts of partisanship, and they do so after controlling for the effects of the other variables in 
each of the models –both those associated with long-standing theories of German partisanship 
and those of unique importance to each of the three populations.  The rho statistic at the 
bottom of each table indicates that there is a correlation between the processes by which 
respondents support a party and the particular party preferred. 
Another set of variables influences the probability that respondents support a party, if not 
the choice of the particular party, in all three populations.  For everyone –no matter if they are 
veteran citizens or new entrants to the electorate, or not even citizens –the earlier in the 
history of the survey it is, the more likely are they to support a party.  Similarly, the closer in 
time is the response to a national election, the more likely is the respondent to support a party.  
These results reaffirm the secular decline in the level of partisanship and the ability of 
national elections to pause this that we noted in Figure 1.  Note as well that the individual 
level variable –political interest –influences the probability of party support.  Consider, 
  14however, that variation in the level education does not influence partisan support, once the 
analysis controls for the level of political interest and income, variables that follow from 
education.  The more interested in politics is a person, the more likely is he or she to support a 
party.   
Examining Table 3 shows that other variables also influence micro-partisanship among 
West Germans.  As expected, the oldest and youngest persons are least likely to support a 
party.  Here, we see two different effects at work: the tendency for young West Germans –like 
other young persons in established democracies –to display relatively low levels of 
partisanship.  This too characterizes the oldest cohorts, but we cannot disentangle potential 
generational and life-cycle effects.  Among those who do name a party, however, the 
probability of choosing one or the other of the two major parties rises with age.
14  Different 
measures of social class and religious identification reaffirm the ties between the middle class 
and Catholics and the CDU/CSU and the working class and the SPD.  To return to the social 
logic of politics, volunteer work and the number of social contacts also consistently affect the 
probability of supporting a party.  Note as well that economic worries distinguish support for 
the two dominant parties.   
Place Table 3a Here 
Table 3b shows that as expected, East Germans display no association between age and the 
probability of supporting a party.  These new citizens share the absence of a history of 
personal experiences with these political parties, and they enter the electorate at the same 
moment.  Note as well that social contacts are also not associated with partisan support.  Here, 
occupation and various economic worries have very different influences on the party 
supported than do these variables among West Germans.  Note too that religious self-
identification separates those who prefer the CDU/CSU from partisans of the SPD and PDS, 
                                                 
14 Because we focus only on the two major parties, we omit the tendency for young Germans to 
support the Greens. 
  15even as religion increases the likelihood of supporting any party.  Religious differences help 
to underpin the partisanship of East Germans.  Finally, factors unique to this group –views of 
the GDR itself and the Re-Unification –also help to explain the party supported.  Support for 
the PDS, the reincarnated dominant party of the GDR, flows from positive assessments of that 
regime and negative views of the transformation of the German polity. 
Place Table 3b Here 
Table 3c applies the model to partisanship among immigrants in Germany.  Again, the 
partisan balance in the household and the region affect both partisan support and the party 
named, as do gender and self-employment.  These variables along with education, German 
citizenship, and the number of years that the respondent has lived in Germany influence party 
support, but not choosing the SPD.  This implies a more general interpretation that meshes 
with the social logic of partisanship: the greater the number of social ties to persons who 
support (or are likely to support) a political party and the greater the level of commitment to 
Germany –as displayed by the descriptions of the household and region, union membership, 
political interest, education, citizenship and length of residence –the more likely is the 
immigrant to be a partisan (see Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991 and Cho 1999 for similar 
arguments applied to immigrants in the United States.)  In turn, choice of the SPD is linked to 
working class occupations and the absence of religion, and country of origin, as well as the 
political preferences of the members of the respondents’ households and states. 
Place Table 3c Here 
The concluding step in our analysis uses post-estimation techniques, drawing on the 
results of Table 3.  Here, we present the predicted probabilities of selecting one or another of 
the major parties for persons with particular characteristics. 
Table 4 highlights the powerful impact of a person’s immediate political context on 
decisions to support one or the other of the major parties.  In each case, household 
partisanship is much more important than the aggregate partisan preferences in the 
  16respondent’s region of residence.  Put simply and directly, West and East Germans who live 
with others who favor one of the major parties are at least twice as likely to prefer that party 
as the mean respondent.  The probability of picking that party hovers around 0.7.  Among 
immigrants, where particularized partisanship does not much vary, the relationship is weaker 
but still powerful, making the selection of the SPD almost certain, with the probability 
approximately 0.85.   
Place Table 4 Here 
Our multivariate analyses highlight the other variables that sustain partisan choice in 
the three samples.  Applying post-estimation techniques to these models allows us to detail 
the social and political contexts of partisan choice.  Consider the results of different 
combinations of characteristics for the predicted selection of each of the parties in each of the 
three samples: 
The predicted marginal probability of SPD support (mean =0.36 for West Germans, 0.28 
for East Germans, and .67 for immigrants) of a person, who is 
a.  West German, non-Catholic, member of a labor union, living in an SPD 
household in an SPD region: 0.90. 
b.  West German, Catholic, not member of a labor union, living in a non-SPD 
household in a non-SPD region: 0.12.  If this person lives in a CDU/CSU 
household: 0.02. 
c.  East German, atheist, member of a labor union, living in an SPD-household 
in an SPD region: 0.84.  
d.  East German, Catholic, not member of a labor union, living in a non-SPD 
household in a non SPD area:  0.13.  If this person lives in a CDU/CSU 
household: 0.02. 
e.  Immigrant, not a Catholic or Protestant, member of a labor union, living 
in an SPD household in an SPD region: 0.90. 
  17f.  Immigrant, Catholic or Protestant, not member of a labor union, living 
in a non SPD household in a non SPD region: 0.37. 
The predicted marginal probability CDU/CSU support (mean=0.31 for West Germans and 
0.19 for East Germans) of a person, who is 
a.  West German, non-Catholic, member of a labor union, living in a 
non-CDU/CSU household in non-CDU/CSU region: 0.07.  If this person 
lives in an SPD household: 0.01. 
b.  West German, Catholic, not member of a labor union, living in a CDU/CSU 
household in a CDU/CSU region: 0.86. 
c.  East German, atheist, member of a labor union, living in a non-CDU/CSU 
household in a non-CDU/CSU region: 0.06. If this person lives in an SPD 
household: 0.01. 
d.  East German, Catholic, not member of a labor union, living in a CDU/CSU-
household in a CDU/CSU region: 0.90. 
The predicted marginal probability PDS support (mean=.15) for an East German, who is 
a.  an atheist, very positive about the GDR, living in a PDS household and PDS region: 
0.90. 
b. Catholic  or  Protestant, very negative about the GDR, living in a non PDS household in 
a non PDS region: < 0.01. 
The results are clear, strong, and persistent: at the extremes of social and political 
context, persons are certain to support one of the major parties and certain not to support the 
others.  Some of these findings are well-established, as scholars and lay observers of German 
politics have long observed an association between union membership and the lack of 
religiosity and support for the SPD and between Catholic religious identification and the 
absence of union ties and support for the CDU/CSU.  Our research adds to this by uncovering 
and detailing the more critical importance of the partisan contexts in households for partisan 
  18choice.  These ties sustain the more abstract relationship between social class, religion, and 
partisanship. 
At the same time, our research addresses the extent to which Germans live their lives in 
reinforcing political contexts.  Table 5 presents the population distributions in each of the 
relevant social locations and how they overlap.  Note most importantly than no more than 
one-third of the West German respondents live in partisan households.  Note too that sixteen 
percent belong to trade unions.  To follow this example, no more than one-fourth of the West 
Germans are members of trade unions who live in a household most of whose other members 
support the SPD.  Similarly, the same percentage are Catholics most of whose other members 
support the CDU/CSU.  Conversely, half the West Germans do not display the two variables 
that most strongly influence partisan choice.  In turn, the generalized consequences are 
relatively easy to specify: variation in the social and political contexts of person’s lives 
strongly influence their partisanship and the party chosen.  But it is critical to underline that 
these factors are variables.  Persons vary in the extent to which they live their lives so that 
they encounter persons whose party choices reinforce their own.
15  When that happens, 
persons are certain to support the appropriate party; when it does not, the probability of 
support declines dramatically.  
Conclusions 
West Germans, East Germans, and immigrants to Germany all display bounded 
partisanship.  Almost all never support at least one of the major parties and vary their support 
for their own party, by also claiming no party preference.  Partisan choice is a bifurcated 
variable: to support or not support one of the major parties.  Differences among the three 
groups appear: they vary in the extent to which they ever support a party: during a decade of 
annual observations, 1992-2002: 22 percent of the West Germans; forty percent of the East 
                                                 
15 See Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2005); Zuckerman and Kotler-Berkowitz (1998) and 
Zuckerman, Fitzgerald, and Dasović (2005) for evidence of variations in political cohesion among 
intimate social networks in the United States and Great Britain, as well as Germany. 
  19Germans and 43 percent of the immigrants never say that they incline towards a political 
party.  While years of exposure to democratic politics would seem to account for this 
difference, the SOEP data do not show rising levels of generalized partisanship over time.  
Partisan support is more than the result of a gradual accumulation of interest in democratic 
politics. 
Our analysis highlights the social logic of partisanship.  For the respondents in all 
three samples –West Germans, East Germans, and immigrants to Germany –the social context 
of people’s lives affect both the claim to support a party and the particular party named.  The 
partisan hue of a person’s household plays a particularly powerful role: where there is a 
balance in favor of party A, the respondent is highly likely to also prefer Party A and not 
name party B, its rival.  The partisan composition of the state affects this prior as well.  
Reflecting well known understandings of the relationship among social class, religion, and 
German partisanship, union membership and religion also consistently affect party choice.  
No matter the differences among the West Germans, East Germans, and immigrants, both sets 
of factors strongly influence generalized and particularized partisanship.  The analysis 
underscores the social logic of partisanship in Germany 
 
Appendix - Measures for Tables 3-5 
According to the German census bureau (http://www.desatis.de/.e_home.htm go to 
population) in 2003, 82.5 million persons lived in Germany.  67.5 million were in the states 
that once composed West Germany and 15 million lived in the lands of the former East 
Germany.  7.3 million foreigners (excluding illegal immigrants) resided in the county, 6.9 
million in the West and 0.4 million in the East.  As a result, 60.6 million persons (73 percent 
of the total) were veteran citizens (labeled here as West Germans); 14.6 million (18 percent) 
were new citizens (East Germans), and 7.3 million (9 percent) were foreigners.   The 1.9 
million Turks provided the largest group among the foreigners.  
  20The immigrants are “guest workers,” persons recruited to work in Germany from the 
countries of southern Europe, between 1955 and 1973.  Almost all of these came from and 
remained in the working class.  As noted in the text, Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks, but not 
Turks, may vote in local and European elections, even when they are not citizens of Germany.  
During the years 1980-2000, 3 million foreigners received German citizenship.  In SOEP’s 
foreigners sample (Sample B), 96 percent of the foreigners in 1984 were not German citizens 
(not 100 percent because some foreigners lived with German citizens).  In 2002, 75 percent of 
this sample were not citizens of Germany, indicating increasing levels of citizenship or co-
residents with Germans, or both among this group.  In 2002, SOEP asked non-citizens if they 
planned to apply for citizenship.  Approximately 25 percent said they would.  When asked if 
they would apply if they could also keep their original citizenship about fifty percent said they 
would do so during the next two years. 
The measure of education uses the CASMIN Scale (Comparative Analysis of Social 
Mobility in Industrial Nations), which has been developed to allow for a cross-national 
comparison of educational degrees.  This measure is widely used in sociology.  It has been 
collapsed into three categories: low, medium, and high education.  We have omitted those “in 
school,” because there are very few of these persons. 
The following question defines political interest: “First of all in general: How 
interested are you in politics?”  Then the respondents are offered the following choices: “Very 
interested [4 points], fairly interested [3 points], not very interested [2 point], and not 
interested [1 point].”  
  Religion is measured by a question that asks about “membership in a church or 
denomination.”  It allows for five options: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Other Christian, non-
Christian, and no religion.   
Both time variables use days as the unit of analysis, not years.  Age: we use a variable 
of the linear time trend (which is 0 for the first SOEP interview Jan 1 1984 and ranges to 20+ 
  21((last interview date in wave 20)).  Distance from an election has been transformed to give 
more weight to days that are close to elections as compared to those that are in the middle of 
an election cycle. 
Economic worries: 1=no worries, 2=some, 3=very worried. 
  Questions on volunteer work and social contact are found in the context of how persons 
spend their time and are asked most every second year.    Here is the wording:  Now some 
questions about your free time. How frequently do you do the following activities?  
- volunteer work in clubs, associations, or social services 
- visit with friends, relatives, or neighbors 
Answers range from never to weekly.   Because the time use variables are over dispersed on 
the category "never," we recoded them to binary variables of "no=never" and "yes=else." 
For the immigrants: command of German relative to mother tongue = (German 
speaking + German writing) - (mother tongue speaking + mother tongue writing); range: -8 to 
+8, values denote that respondent's command of German is better than his/hers command of 
mother tongue.  Data on this variable has been collected in at least every second wave. 
For the East Germans: (a) positive view of the GDR and (b) skepticism about the 
transformation, we generated two additive scales based on (a) respondent's satisfaction with 
democracy in the GDR and respondent's satisfaction with social security in the GDR and (b) 
respondent's worries about the "new" living conditions surveyed in 1990 and 1991.  We tested 
the "scalability" of these items by means of a non-parametric probability scaling model for 
polychotmous items called Mokken-scaling. 
Political preferences in the household:  In order to create this summary score for each 
member of the household (excluding the primary respondent), we first assign a party support 
score for each household member for each wave of the surveys.  These first -stage values 
were 1 for SPD support, 2 for the CDU/CSU, and 0 for no party or third party support.  If an 
  22individual lives alone, their family support value is set at zero.  For West Germans, the PDS 
category is set at 0, as are the CDU/CSU and PDS for immigrant. 
Political preferences in the region:  first we calculate the percentage of general 
partisanship in each Federal state (range 0-1).  Then, we calculated the percentage of support 
for each party in each Federal state, given the level of general party support.  For example, in 
a state in which 60 percent of the respondents supported a party and 15 percent supported the 
CDU/CSU, 25 percent supported the CDU/CSU in the state (0.15 * 1/.6=0.25). 
Religious denomination and union membership as stable traits are surveyed 
infrequently in the SOEP.  The data presented in Table 5 on religion come from 1977 and 
those on union membership from 1998 (data on union membership).  As the table refers to a 
short panel of two data points and not the whole range of years of the SOEP, numbers of 
observations are lower than in previous tables. This is particularly true for the West German 
and immigrant sample (starting in 1984) as these are plagued in 1997 by higher overall 
attrition rates than the East German sample (starting in 1990) (Kroh and Spiess 2004). 
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Table 1a  Relative frequency of partisanship 1992 – 2002 
  
 West  Germans  East Germans  Immigrants 
  CDU/CSU  SPD None CDU SPD PDS None SPD None 
0  0.61  0.54 0.30 0.70 0.63 0.83 0.13 0.50 0.07 
1  0.06  0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.05 
2  0.03  0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.04 
3  0.02  0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 
4  0.02  0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 
5  0.02  0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04 
6  0.01  0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 
7  0.02  0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.05 
8  0.02  0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.05 
9  0.03  0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.08 
10  0.04  0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.13 
11  0.11  0.12 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.39 
            






Table 1b  Relative frequency of partisanship 1992 – 2002 of those who ever pick this party 
  
 West  Germans  East Germans  Immigrants 
 CDU/CSU  SPD  None  CDU  SPD  PDS No  PI SPD None 
1  0.16  0.15 0.15 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.08 0.25 0.05 
2  0.07  0.09 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.04 
3  0.06  0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 
4  0.05  0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 
5  0.06  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 
6  0.04  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 
7  0.06  0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 
8  0.06  0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 
9  0.07  0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.09 
10  0.10  0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.14 
11  0.29  0.26 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.20 0.27 0.06 0.42 
            




  33Table 1c  Relative frequency of partisanship-combinations 1992 – 2002 
  
 West  Germans  East Germans  Immigrants 
CDU/CSU & SPD  0.06  0.07  - 
CDU/CSU  &  PDS  - 0.02 - 
CDU/CSU & None  0.26  0.26  - 
SPD  &  PDS  - 0.05 - 
SPD & None  0.30  0.32  - 
PDS  &  None  - 0.13 - 
CDU/CSU & SPD & PDS   -  0.01  - 
      





Table 1d  Relative frequency of partisanship 1992 – 2002. 
  
 West  Germans East Germans  Immigrants 
Never supporting the CDU/CSU or the SPD  0.22  0.40  0.43 
Never supporting the SPD but sometimes the CDU/CSU  0.33  0.23  0.07 
Never supporting the CDU/CSU but sometimes the SPD  0.39  0.30  0.43 
Sometimes supporting the CDU/CSU and sometimes the SPD 0.06  0.07  0.08 
Total 1.00  1.00  1.00 
  
N 2939  1533  747 
Source. SOEP. 




  34Table 2a    Intra-individual  tetrachoric  correlations  of  partisanship among West Germans 1992 – 2002 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
C D U / C S U               
1 9 9 2   1 . 0 0             
1993  0.93  1.00           
1994  0.92  0.95  1.00          
1995  0.93  0.93  0.95  1.00         
1996  0.92  0.92  0.94  0.96  1.00        
1997  0.92  0.93  0.93  0.95  0.96  1.00       
1998  0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.96 1.00         
1999  0.91 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95 1.00       
2000  0.88 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 1.00     
2001  0.88 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 1.00   
2002  0.90 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 1.00 
S P D                 
1 9 9 2   1 . 0 0             
1993  0.92  1.00           
1994  0.92  0.93  1.00          
1995  0.92  0.92  0.93  1.00         
1996  0.90  0.91  0.92  0.94  1.00        
1997  0.90  0.90  0.91  0.93  0.95  1.00       
1998  0.88 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.94 1.00         
1999  0.88 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.93 1.00       
2000  0.88 0.88 0.78 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.95 1.00     
2001  0.87 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.94 1.00   
2002  0.85 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.94 1.00 
N o n e                 
1 9 9 2   1 . 0 0             
1993  0.81  1.00           
1994  0.80  0.84  1.00          
1995  0.80  0.81  0.84  1.00         
1996  0.78  0.79  0.82  0.85  1.00        
1997  0.77  0.78  0.82  0.85  0.87  1.00       
1998  0.76 0.75 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.86 1.00         
1999  0.75 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.85 1.00       
2000  0.74 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.85 1.00     
2001  0.73 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.83 1.00   
2002  0.71 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.86 1.00 




  35Table 2b     Intra-individual tetrachoric correlations of partisanship among East Germans, 1992 – 2002 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
C D U               
1 9 9 2   1 . 0 0             
1993  0.88  1.00           
1994  0.84  0.88  1.00          
1995  0.83  0.84  0.88  1.00         
1996  0.82 0.82 0.87 0.92 1.00             
1997  0.83 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.93 1.00           
1998  0.79 0.79 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.94 1.00         
1999  0.74 0.76 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.93 1.00       
2000  0.78 0.76 0.85 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.95 1.00     
2001  0.76 0.72 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.94 1.00   
2002  0.76 0.74 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.93 0.94 0.92 1.00 
S P D                 
1 9 9 2   1 . 0 0             
1993  0.83  1.00           
1994  0.81  0.86  1.00          
1995  0.78  0.82  0.87  1.00         
1996  0.76 0.77 0.85 0.90 1.00             
1997  0.76 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.91 1.00           
1998  0.77 078 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.89 1.00         
1999  0.69 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.84 1.00       
2000  0.74 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.88 1.00     
2001  0.70 0.73 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.91 1.00   
2002  0.70 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.84 0.88 0.91 1.00 
P D S              
1 9 9 2   1 . 0 0             
1993  0.98  1.00           
1994  0.96  0.97  1.00          
1995  0.96  0.95  0.93  1.00         
1996  0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 1.00             
1997  0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.95 1.00           
1998  0.96 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 1.00         
1999  0.93 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.95 1.00       
2000  0.93 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.96 1.00     
2001  0.90 0.99 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.95 1.00   
2002  0.92 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.96 1.00 
N o n e                 
1 9 9 2   1 . 0 0             
1993  0.75  1.00           
1994  0.71  0.82  1.00          
1995  0.67  0.71  0.76  1.00         
1996  0.68 0.71 0.75 0.81 1.00             
1997  0.69 0.76 0.81 0.80 0.85 1.00           
1998  0.67 0.71 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.86 1.00         
1999  0.61 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.83 1.00       
2000  0.67 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.85 1.00     
2001  0.64 0.64 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.86 1.00   
2002  0.63 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.84 0.86 1.00 
Source. SOEP. N = 1533. 
 
 
  36Table 2c   Intra-individual  tetrachoric  correlations  of  partisanship among immigrants 1992 – 2002 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
S P D                 
1992  1.00            
1993  0.73  1.00           
1994  0.72  0.74  1.00          
1995  0.78  0.78  0.81  1.00         
1996  0.79  0.75  0.83  0.90  1.00        
1997  0.70 0.70 0.77 0.81 0.83 1.00           
1998  0.64 0.68 0.68 0.76 0.83 0.82 1.00         
1999  0.65 0.71 0.70 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.82 1.00       
2000  0.61 0.67 0.68 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.75 0.81 1.00     
2001  0.66 0.67 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.81 1.00   
2002  0.63 0.60 0.57 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.72 0.79 0.81 0.86 1.00 
N o n e                 
1992  1.00            
1993  0.71  1.00           
1994  0.74  0.77  1.00          
1995  0.77  0.80  0.82  1.00         
1996  0.77  0.73  0.82  0.89  1.00        
1997  0.71 0.70 0.78 0.80 0.83 1.00           
1998  0.68 0.69 0.72 0.80 0.80 0.79 1.00         
1999  0.69 0.72 0.72 0.80 0.76 0.74 0.83 1.00       
2000  0.62 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.77 0.83 1.00     
2001  0.65 0.67 0.69 0.73 0.81 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.82 1.00   
2002  0.62 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.85 1.00 






  37Table 3a     Partisanship among West Germans 1985 – 2002 
  Party Support 
Model  CDU/CSU Model  SPD Model 
Variables in all models      
 Intercept    -  3.08***  (0.14)    -  1.63***  (0.15)    -  1.69***  (0.16) 
 Gender  (1  =  female)     0.01      (0.02)    -  0.10***  (0.03)     0.04      (0.03) 
 Age     0.03***  (0.00)     0.02***  (0.00)     0.03***  (0.00) 
 Age
2    -  0.00***  (0.00)    -  0.00*     (0.00)    -  0.00***  (0.00) 
  Time trend (1985 – 2002)      - 0.02***    (0.00)    -  0.02***  (0.00)     0.01***  (0.00) 
  Religion     
  None / Other  - - - 
  Catholic     0.03      (0.02)     0.50***  (0.04)    -  0.30***  (0.04) 
  Protestant     0.02      (0.02)     0.03      (0.04)     0.05      (0.04) 
  Occupation     
  Blue  Collar  - - - 
  Self  Employed     0.07*     (0.04)     0.52***  (0.06)    -  0.72***  (0.06) 
  White  Collar     0.04*     (0.03)     0.15***  (0.04)    -  0.21***  (0.04) 
  Not  Employed     0.02      (0.02)     0.13***  (0.04)    -  0.28***  (0.04) 
 Equivalence  income     0.00**    (0.00)     0.01***  (0.00)    -  0.01***  (0.00) 
 Equivalence  income
2    -  0.00      (0.00)    -  0.00***  (0.00)     0.00***  (0.00) 
 Union  Membership     0.13***  (0.02)    -  0.37***  (0.04)     0.44***  (0.04) 
Variables in Party Support Model     
  Education     
  L o w   -   
  Medium     0.00      (0.02)     
  High     0.07*     (0.04)     
 Political  Interest     0.51***  (0.01)           
 Voluntary  Work     0.11***  (0.02)     
  Social contacts (friends, family,  etc.)     0.10***  (0.03)     
 Party  support  in  federal  state     1.46***  (0.14)     
 Party  support  in  household  in  t–1     0.64***  (0.01)     
  Distance to national elections (ln(days))    -  0.02***  (0.01)     
Variables in Party-Specific Models     
 Worries  about  national  economy      -  0.03*     (0.01)     0.08***  (0.02) 
  Worries about own economic situation       -  0.07***  (0.01)     0.05***  (0.01) 
  CDU/CSU/SPD preference in federal state       1.22***  (0.20)     1.55***  (0.21) 
  Party pref in hh at t–1 (Ref. no or 3
rd  party)     
   Majority  of  CDU/CSU  preference       1.35***  (0.03)    -  1.06***  (0.04) 
   Majority  of  SPD  preference      -  0.97***  (0.04)     1.15***  (0.03) 
ρ       0.29***  (0.04)   0.27***  (0.04) 
N   22631  22631 
Log Likelihood    -90252.49  -92136.92 





  38Table 3b      Partisanship among East Germans 1992 – 2002 
  Party Support 
Model  CDU Model  SPD Model  PDS Model 
Variables in all models       
Intercept  - 2.26***    (0.28)  - 1.44***    (0.35)  - 1.98***    (0.34)  - 2.16***    (0.44) 
Gender  (1  =  female)  -  0.11***  (0.03)   0.03      (0.06)  -  0.13**    (0.06)   0.10      (0.07) 
Age   0.00      (0.01)   0.05***  (0.01)   0.04***  (0.01)  -  0.06***  (0.01) 
Age
2   0.00      (0.00)  -  0.00***  (0.00)  -  0.00**    (0.00)   0.00***  (0.00) 
Time trend (1992 – 2002)  - 0.02***    (0.00)  - 0.02***    (0.01)   0.01      (0.01)   0.03***  (0.01) 
Religion      
  None / Other  - - - - 
 Catholic   0.32***  (0.06)   0.64***  (0.10)  -  0.23*     (0.12)  -  0.46***  (0.17) 
 Protestant   0.07**    (0.04)   0.48***  (0.06) -  0.18***    (0.06) -  0.64***    (0.09) 
  Occupation      
  Blue  Collar  - - - - 
  Self  Employed   0.06      (0.07)  -  0.12      (0.12)  -  0.52***  (0.12)   0.36**    (0.15) 
  White  Collar   0.00      (0.04)  -  0.26***  (0.08)   0.04      (0.08)   0.26**    (0.10) 
  Not  Employed   0.04      (0.04)  -  0.15**    (0.07)  -  0.04      (0.07)   0.26***  (0.09) 
Equivalence  income   0.00      (0.04)  -  0.00      (0.00)  -  0.01      (0.00)   0.00      (0.01) 
Equivalence income
2   0.00      (0.00)   0.00      (0.00)   0.00      (0.00)  -  0.00      (0.00) 
Union  Membership   0.08**    (0.03)  -  0.21***  (0.06)   0.17***  (0.06)   0.09      (0.07) 
Member  of  the  GDR  Administration  -  0.00      (0.04)  -  0.09      (0.06)  -  0.04      (0.06)   0.06      (0.08) 
Positive  View  of  GDR  -  0.01      (0.01)  -  0.09***  (0.02)  -  0.07***  (0.02)   0.22***  (0.03) 
Skepticism  about  Transformation  -  0.01      (0.02)  -  0.17***  (0.03)   0.06**    (0.03)   0.12***  (0.04) 
Variables in Party Support Model      
Education      
 Low  -    
 Medium  -  0.04      (0.04)       
 High   0.02      (0.05)       
Political  Interest   0.55***  (0.02)                
Voluntary  Work   0.15***  (0.03)       
   0.10      (0.06)       
Party support in federal states    1.71***    (0.31)       
Party support in hh at t–1    0.77***    (0.03)       
Distance to national elections (ln(days))  -  0.06***    (0.01)     
Variables in Party-Specific Models      
Worries about national economy    - 0.10***    (0.03)   0.04      (0.03)   0.08**    (0.04) 
Worries about own economic situation    - 0.04         (0.03)  -  0.02      (0.03)   0.04      (0.05) 
CDU/SPD/PDS preference in state      2.05***    (0.30)   1.95***  (0.31)   2.04***  (0.57) 
Party preference in hh at t–1 (Ref. else)         
  Majority  of  CDU  preference     1.48***  (0.07) -  1.00***    (0.09) -  1.00***    (0.12) 
  Majority  of  SPD  preference    -  0.70***  (0.08)   1.17***  (0.07)  -  0.78***  (0.09) 
  Majority  of  PDS  preference    -  0.85***  (0.15)  -  1.17***  (0.11)   1.52***  (0.10) 
ρ     0.42***  (0.06)   0.10      (0.07)   0.19**    (0.08) 
N   3792  3792  3792 
Log  Likelihood    -21188.22 -21895.14 -19586.28 





  39Table3c      Partisanship among Immigrants 1985 – 2002 
  Party Support 
Model  SPD Model 
Variables in both models    
 Intercept    -  2.15***  (0.38)    -  1.20**    (0.53) 
  Gender (1 = female)      - 0.15***    (0.05)    -  0.11      (0.08) 
 Age     0.00      (0.01)     0.02      (0.02) 
 Age
2    -  0.00      (0.00)    -  0.00      (0.00) 
 Time  trend  (1985  –  2002)    -  0.04***  (0.00)    -  0.01      (0.00) 
  Religion (1 = Catholic/Protestant; 0 = else)
1    -  0.00      (0.06)    -  0.29***  (0.11) 
 Occupation     
  Blue  Collar  - - 
  Self  Employed    -  0.27**    (0.11)    -  0.45***  (0.17) 
  White  Collar    -  0.00      (0.08)    -  0.19      (0.13) 
  Not  Employed     0.04      (0.04)     0.00      (0.11) 
 Equivalence  income     0.00      (0.00)    -  0.00      (0.00) 
 Equivalence  income
2    -  0.00      (0.00)     0.00      (0.00) 
 Union  Membership     0.21***  (0.04)     0.16**    (0.07) 
  Country of Origin     
  Turkey  - - 
  Yugoslavia    -  0.02      (0.06)     0.28***  (0.11) 
  Greece    -  0.09      (0.06)     0.06      (0.12) 
  Italy    -  0.04      (0.07)     0.39***  (0.13) 
  Spain     0.12      (0.08)     0.37**    (0.15) 
Variables in Party Support Model    
 Education     
  L o w   -  
  Medium     0.08*     (0.04)   
  High     0.14      (0.11)   
 Political  Interest     0.84***  (0.02)      
 Voluntary  Work     0.25***  (0.05)   
  Social contacts (friends, family, relatives)     0.05      (0.08)   
 Party  support  in  federal  state     0.93***  (0.30)   
 Party  support  in  household  at  t–1     0.81***  (0.04)   
  Distance to national elections (ln(days))    -  0.03*     (0.02)   
 German  Citizenship     0.46**    (0.19)   
 Command  of  German  (relative  to  mother  tongue)     0.01      (0.01)   
  Years living in Germany     
    –  10  years    -  
  10  –  20  years     0.13**    (0.06)   
  20  –  30  years     0.18**    (0.08)   
  30  +    years     0.39***  (0.10)   
Variables in the SPD Model    
 Worries  about  national  economy       0.01      (0.04) 
 Worries  about  own  economic  situation       0.05      (0.04) 
 SPD  preference  in  federal  state       1.76***  (0.57) 
  SPD preference in household at t–1          0.70***    (0.06) 
ρ       0.31***  (0.06) 
N   3595 
Log Likelihood    -11622.46 
Source. SOEP. Adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10. 
1Because other religion is almost always Muslim and because that overlaps with a Turkish country of origin, we have opted to focus the 








  40Table 4     Predicted marginal probability of party preference by household and regional context.  
  Pr(CDU = 1 | PI = 1) Pr(SPD = 1 | PI = 1)  Pr(PDS = 1 | PI = 1) 
West Germans     
Party preference in Household       
  No Party / Third Party  0.22  0.27  - 
 Partisan  HH  0.72  0.71  - 
Party preference in Region       
 25%  0.25  0.25  - 
 50%  0.36  0.38  - 
Extremes     
  No/Third Party HH & Party Size 25%  0.17  0.17  - 
  Partisan HH & Party Size 50%  0.76  0.73  - 
Average 0.31  0.36  - 
East Germans     
Party preference in Household       
  No Party / Third Party  0.15  0.24  0.14 
 Partisan  HH  0.67  0.68  0.66 
Party preference in Region       
  25% (10% for PDS)  0.14  0.23  0.12 
  50% (10% for PDS)  0.28  0.40  0.16 
Extremes     
  No/Third Party HH & Party Size 25(10)%  0.10  0.20  0.11 
  Partisan HH & Party Size 50(20)%  0.77  0.79  0.69 
Average 0.19  0.28  0.15 
Immigrants     
Party preference in Household       
  No Party / Third Party  -  0.62  - 
 Partisan  HH  -  0.84  - 
Party preference in Region       
 25%  -  0.52  - 
 50%  -  0.69  - 
Extremes     
  No/Third Party HH & Party Size 25%  -  0.46  - 
  Partisan HH & Party Size 50%  -  0.85  - 
Average -  0.67  - 
Source. SOEP. Post-estimation analysis is based on models reported in Tables 3 a to c.  
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Table 5     Social and Political Contexts of Party Choice. 
 West  Germans  East  Germans  Immigrants 
Member of Labor Union  0.16  0.17  0.15 
Religion     
 Catholic  0.42  0.04  0.33 
 Protestant  0.42  0.24  0.05 
 Other/None  0.16  0.72  0.68 
Partisanship in Household       
 CDU/CSU  0.20  0.13  - 
 SPD  0.19  0.09  0.19 
 PDS  -  0.06  - 
 Else/None/Single-Person  HH  0.61  0.72  0.81 
Number  of  Observations  5471 3528 1673 
Member of Labor Union & Catholic  0.39  0.06  0.38 
                    Protestant  0.40  0.22  0.04 
                    Other/None  0.21  0.73  0.58 
                    C D U / C S U   H H   0 . 1 3   0 . 1 3   -  
                    S P D   H H   0 . 2 9   0 . 0 9   0 . 2 0  
                    P D S   H H   -   0 . 0 9   -  
                    E l s e   H H   0 . 5 8   0 . 7 0   0 . 8 0  
Number of Observations  852  567  252 
Catholic (West Germans) & CDU/CSU HH  0.27  0.22  - 
Catholic & Protest. (Else)   SPD HH  0.15  0.07  0.19 
                    P D S   H H   -   0 . 0 3   -  
                    E l s e   H H   0 . 5 8   0 . 6 8   0 . 8 1  
Number of Observations  2292  928  621 
Source: SOEP.  See the Appendix for details on the data used in this table 
 